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COMMENT

THE FACEBOOK IPO’S FACE-OFF WITH DUAL CLASS
STOCK STRUCTURE
Anna S. Han*
The Facebook initial public offering (“Facebook IPO”) is
premised on a dual class stock structure, which the media
criticizes as a circumvention of regulations designed to protect
shareholders. I argue that Facebook’s use of dual class stock not
only is likely to benefit its shareholders, but also follows in the
footsteps of seasoned, influential companies like Google.
A. THE FACEBOOK IPO
The Facebook IPO is one of the most widely discussed and
anticipated events in the U.S. financial and technology industries.
Much media attention is devoted to the IPO’s positive economic
and social impact—revitalizing the stock market and attracting
young adults as potential investors are just a couple examples of
such impact. 1 There is a small but noticeable concern, however,
regarding the future of Facebook’s corporate governance—
specifically, Mark Zuckerberg’s control of the company following
the IPO. 2
While most private companies that go public choose a singleclass share structure whereby each share equals one vote,
Facebook will emerge from the offering with its CEO as the

*
1.

J.D. Candidate, May 2013, University of Michigan Law School.
Michael Giles, Facebook IPO Will Bring a Whole New Generation to the Stock
Market, HUFF POST MONEY (Mar. 6, 2012, 12:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michae
l-giles/facebook-ipo_b_1290659.html.
2.
See Leena Rao, Facebook’s S-1 and the Largest Shareholders, TECH. CRUNCH (Feb.
1, 2012) [hereinafter Facebook’s S-1], http://techcrunch.com/2012/02/01/facebooks-s-1-andthe-largest-shareholders-who-owns-what/; Claire Moore, Facebook IPO Slated to Be the
Largest in History of Silicon Valley, ARRIVE PREPARED (Feb. 7, 2012), http://blog.highbeamb
usiness.com/ 2012/02/facebook-ipo-slated-to-be-largest-in-history-of-silicon-valley-but-will-itmake-you-rich/.
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controlling shareholder. 3 Now that its financial statements are
public (due to the Form S-1 that Facebook filed in compliance
with federal securities regulations), all potential investors have
access to information on Facebook’s current shareholder
breakdown.4 Zuckerberg stands as, unsurprisingly, the largest
shareholder with 28.2% of the company. Even though Zuckerberg
will ultimately own only about a quarter of the company, SEC
filings reveal he will still hold 57.1% of Facebook’s voting control
after the IPO. He made this possible by first classifying Facebook
as a “controlled company” and subsequently converting his shares
into super-voting stock. 5 This maneuver has spawned some
controversy among followers of the Facebook IPO. Some applaud
Zuckerberg’s actions as an enlightened corporate decision while
others denounce it as risky, bringing up “the chance he’ll become
some Mad King, succumbing to erratic rule somewhere down the
line.” 6
The more immediate concern, however, is the impact this dual
class voting structure will have on Facebook’s newly minted
shareholders following the IPO. It will likely cause companies to
divide ownership interests into different camps, with the
possibility that “[t]hese early fractures can widen into fault lines,
eventually resulting in a costly, distracting, and potentially
unpopular restructuring.” 7 In fact, as the influential proxy
advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) warns, “the
problems for both boards of directors and institutional investors
… will begin the morning after the IPO, when divergent interests
within the shareholder base have been institutionalized .…” 8 In
addition to preventing shareholders from voicing their opinions in
a meaningful way, dual class structures highlight the collective

3.

Dynasty,

See Charley Moore, Should Mark Zuckerberg Think Twice About Establishing a

TECH. CRUNCH (Feb. 11, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/02/11/markzuckerberg-dynasty/; Facebook’s S-1, supra note 2.
4.
See Facebook’s S-1, supra note 2.
5.
See Moore, supra note 3.
6.
See Josh Constine, If Investors Want More Voting Rights, They Should Have
Invested Facebook, TECH. CRUNCH (Feb. 14, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/02/14/facebo
ok-voting-rights/.
7.
The Tragedy of the Dual Class Commons, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES,
Feb. 13, 2012, at 3 [hereinafter Tragedy of the Dual Class Commons] , http://online.wsj.com/
public/ resources/documents/facebook0214.pdf.
8.
See id.
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action problem borne out by shareholder passivity. 9 One
commentator notes that “[t]his passive behavior is thought to
manifest itself when dispersed shareholders in large corporations
realize that the costs associated with agent monitoring are solely
incurred, while the returns are shared pro rata.” 10
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DUAL CLASS STOCK STRUCTURE
Shares of common stock have been historically understood to
represent a bundle of rights, including the right to vote on
corporate decisions. The one-share, one-vote rule emerged in the
1800s as legislatures, suspicious of corporations, shifted the legal
system away from imposing a maximum number of votes for any
individual shareholder. 11 By the mid-1900s, most U.S. corporations
migrated to the one-share, one-vote rule. 12 Because corporations
were not required to adhere to the statutory standard, they started
using nonvoting common stock to retain control after raising
money in the public market. 13 It soon became clear, around 1918,
that a growing number of corporations started using two classes of
stock—one class that obtained full voting rights, and another class
that obtained no voting rights but gained the benefit of a
potentially greater dividend payout. 14
Commonly known as Class A and Class B shares, the former
are composed of preexisting common stock, while the latter
include a proportionally larger amount of votes per share (usually
10). Class B shares are typically not transferrable, but can be
converted to Class A shares to be sold. The use of the separate
classes declined during the Great Depression, but rebounded
during the 1980s as hostile takeovers also became more
prevalent. 15
When corporations started lobbying the NYSE and Amex to
liberalize rules on shareholder voting rights, the SEC tried to
promulgate a one-share, one-vote standard in the form of the
9.
(1994).
10.
11.

Douglas C. Ashton, Revisiting Dual-Class Stock, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 863, 906

Id. at 907.
Stephen Bainbridge, The Scope of the SEC’s Authority over Shareholder Voting
Rights 4 (May 7, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4–537/4537–17.pdf.
12. See id. at 5.
13. See id. at 6.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 7.
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failed Rule 19c-4. 16 Rule 19c-4 attempted to bar companies listed
on national securities exchanges from using super-voting classes
of stock. 17 The D.C. Circuit, deciding not to venture into a realm
already governed by state corporate law and stock exchanges,
struck down the rule in Business Roundtable v. SEC. 18
C. THE ARGUMENT FOR DUAL CLASS STOCK STRUCTURE
Shareholder rights activists and advocates argue that dual
class structures pose many potential harms to effective corporate
governance. For one thing, as the ISS made clear while
lambasting Facebook’s corporate governance choice, 19 dual class
structures may weaken incentives for shareholder control.20 This
means that the more separation of control there is between the
investor and her shares, the less motivated she is to manage the
rights that are attached to the equity. On the other side of the
same problem is entrenchment risk. 21 The more separated the
non-controlling shareholder is from her interests, the higher the
probability that her interests will not be protected. Finally,
scholars have pointed out that dual class structures pose a higher
risk that controlling shareholders will be further incentivized to
extract other internal private benefits of control.22 The idea here is
that controlling shareholders enjoy benefits from their controlling
position, while minority shareholders receive a disproportionate
share of those benefits.
These views have their vociferous advocates, but a survey of
the academic literature and studies across the board show that the
presumed negative effect of dual class stock structures is far from
certain. 23 First and foremost, corporate law scholars generally do
16. Stephen Bainbridge, The Scope of the SEC’s Authority over Shareholder Voting
Rights 8-9 (May 7, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4–537/4537–17.pdf.
17. Id. at 7-9.
18. See id. at 9.
19. See Tragedy of the Dual Class Commons, supra note 7, at 1.
20. Karl Hofstetter, One Size Does Not Fit All: Corporate Governance for “Controlled
Companies”, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & C OM. REG. 597, 649 (2006).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See generally Ashton, supra note 9 (analyzing policy positions of the SEC, NYSE,
and NASD with respect with dual class common stock); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond:
Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1, 76

(1988) (arguing that the New York Stock Exchange should forbid recapitalizations with
dual class common stock); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection
of Sec Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 579 (1991).
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not consider dual class structures associated with IPOs to be
disenfranchising. 24 With the proper disclosure, shareholders are
on notice that the founding entrepreneurs exchange a penalty in
the form of a lower price per share for access to equity markets
without the dilution of control.25 Potential shareholders can then
decide for themselves whether or not to purchase the shares.
Because a company seeking to register its securities on the market
discloses this information up front, there is minimal risk of
investor coercion. In Facebook’s case, the media makes this
information highly public—and thus widely disclosed—in every
instance it makes Facebook’s dual class structure the source of the
IPO’s controversy.
The illusion of shareholder disenfranchisement aside, sound
economic justifications exist for implementing a dual class stock
structure. In the face of hostile takeovers, for example, a dual class
stock structure “can protect outside shareholders from coercive
takeover tactics….” 26 For example, collective action problems
prevent the many shareholders from acting in concert,
dampening their negotiating power. A dual class structure steps in
by forcing bidders to deal with a single controlling group, which
has the effect of increasing the power of all shareholders. 27
Another significant reason founders choose the dual class
structure to begin with is to lower the risk of takeovers. A dual
class structure reduces the likelihood that shareholders will flip
their shares over to a purchaser who then attains control over the
company and removes the incumbent. 28 Without the dual class
structure, managers who foresee—mistakenly or accurately—a
takeover and potential removal may have less incentive to invest
time and money in the company, thereby leaving open the
possibility of a lowering of the company’s value.
Current regulations provide enough protections for investors
of public companies. 29 The media and the ISS worry that the
Facebook IPO’s dual class structure will disenfranchise future noncontrolling shareholders. However, they need not fret. Even
without economic justifications and theoretical studies, a look at
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See Ashton, supra note 9, at 876.
See id. at 884.
See id. at 923.
See id.
See id.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
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the experience of a similarly positioned company, Google,30 offers
proof that a dual class stock structure does not necessarily wield
such destructive power. Facebook will likely follow a similar path
to overwhelming financial and social success, dual class structure
notwithstanding.

30. See Dual-Class Share Structures - The Cost of Control, THE ECONOMIST, Jul. 23,
2011, at 65, available at http://www.economist.com/node/18988938.

